

Congress. - 3

CONFIDENTIAL

Department of State

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM
EXCISE

1000

PAGE 01 OF 02 STATE 060454
ORIGIN NEA-11

2717

STATE 060454

2717

INFO LOG-08 COPY-01 ADS-00 IN-18 EUL-00 SS-00 C-14E-00
DOD-00 M-01 NSCE-00 H-00 PR-10 INRE-00 SP-02
C-01 P-02 036 R

DESCRIBED THE VIEW OF MOST OUTSIDE EXPERTS TO BE THAT, ONCE MOSCOW PULLS OUT, NO AMOUNT OF SOVIET AID WILL PERMIT THE KABUL GOVERNMENT TO SURVIVE. SOLARZ CONCLUDED THE HEARING WITH A STRONGLY SUPPORTIVE EXPRESSION OF HOPE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA WILL BE CONCLUDED FAVORABLY.

DRAFTED BY: NEA/PWB/RAFLATH
APPROVED BY: NEA:RAPECK
N:WHILE

NEA:JHEALUM

-----000147 270000Z /72

O R 262319Z FEB 88
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY DHAKA

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 060454

NEW DELHI FOR UNDER SECRETARY ARMACOST

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, AF, PK, UR, US
SUBJECT: HOUSE HEARINGS ON AFGHANISTAN

4. (U) LEACH OPENED THE QUESTIONING BY ASKING FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS AND ASKED THE NATURE OF THE U.S. UNDERTAKING AS A GUARANTOR. PECK REPLIED THAT OUR OBLIGATION WAS LIMITED TO OUR OWN BEHAVIOR, AND TO RESPECT THE UNDERTAKINGS OF THE OTHER PARTIES. UNDER FURTHER QUESTIONING, HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THIS WOULD MEAN AN END OF ARMS FOR THE RESISTANCE, BUT SAID WHEN AND UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES WAS AN ISSUE WHICH WOULD BE DECIDED BY THE PRESIDENT. SOLARZ ASKED IF THE INSTRUMENTS WERE PUBLIC OR COULD BE SHARED WITH THE CONGRESS. PECK REPLIED THAT THEY COULD NOT BE SHARED BECAUSE THEY WERE GIVEN TO THE USG IN CONFIDENCE, BUT THAT THE CONGRESS WOULD BE TAKEN FULLY INTO OUR CONFIDENCE AS AND WHEN THE GENEVA PROCESS IS COMPLETED.

5. (U) SOLARZ ASKED IF THE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN INFORMED OF THE DECISION TO TERMINATE ASSISTANCE TO THE RESISTANCE

AND FOLLOWED UP BY ASKING IF THE NEW YORK TIMES WAS WRONG. PECK DESCRIBED THE DECEMBER 1985 INITIATIVE AS HAVING BEEN FULLY CLEARED WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION BEFORE WE INFORMED THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL THAT THE U.S. WAS PREPARED TO PLAY A GUARANTOR'S ROLE ONLY IF WE WERE FULLY SATISFIED WITH A COMPLETED GENEVA SETTLEMENT. HE SAID THE GENEVA SETTLEMENT WAS NOT COMPLETE THEN, NOR IS IT NOW; OUR POLICY, WHICH IS A HEAVILY CONDITIONED ONE, HAD NOT CHANGED AND IT IS THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY. HE SAID HE COULD NOT ANSWER IF THE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN INFORMED IN DECEMBER OF 1985.

6. (U) SOLARZ SAID THERE APPEAR TO BE INHERENT ASYMMETRIES IN THE GENEVA ACCORDS WHEREAS THE U.S. CEASES AID TO THE MUJAHIDIN BUT THE SOVIETS ARE PERMITTED TO CONTINUE THEIR AID TO THE KABUL REGIME. HE ASKED FOR THE VIEWS OF THE U.S., CORDOVEZ AND THE SOVIETS ON THIS ISSUE. PECK RESPONDED THAT IT WAS OUR VIEW THAT THE PROVISIONS FOR NON-INTERVENTION AND NON-INTERFERENCE APPLIED EQUALLY TO THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION. HE SAID THE SOVIET POSITION IS NOT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR, BUT THAT THEY ARE LIKELY TO RESIST A FORMAL COMMITMENT. HE DEFERRED TO CORDOVEZ FOR AN EXPRESSION OF HIS OWN VIEWS.

7.

8. (U) SOLARZ THEN PURSUED THE ISSUE OF INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS. HE SOUGHT EXPLANATIONS OF WHY THE PAKISTANIS AND THE SOVIETS HAD CHANGED POSITIONS OVER TIME. HE PRESSED FOR WHAT THE U.S. WOULD DO IF THE GENEVA INSTRUMENTS ARE SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED AND AGREEMENT HAS NOT BEEN REACHED ON AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT. PECK DESCRIBED THE DESIRABILITY OF AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT, SAID THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT INTERNAL POLITICAL QUESTIONS MUST BE SOLVED BY THE AFGHANS THEMSELVES, DESCRIBED THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS NEGOTIATIONS AS BEING ON A SEPARATE TRACK, AND SAID THESE PARALLEL NEGOTIATIONS

1. (C) SUMMARY: THE SOLARZ SUBCOMMITTEE PROVIDED A SYMPATHETIC FORUM FOR DAS PECK TO RESPOND TO THE POLITICALLY SENSITIVE AND DIFFICULT QUESTIONS MAKING THE ROUNDS IN WASHINGTON ABOUT US POLICY ON AFGHANISTAN AS WE APPROACH THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS. QUESTIONS INCLUDED: CAN CONGRESS HAVE COPIES OF THE GENEVA INSTRUMENTS; NO; HOW WILL WE DEAL WITH THE ASYMMETRIES OF THE AID CUT-OFF: PRESS SOVIETS FOR BALANCE; DOES IT MATTER: IT IS NOT MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT; CAN THE NAJIB REGIME SURVIVE WITH OR WITHOUT ADDITIONAL SOVIET ARMS: NO; WHAT IS US VIEW OF INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS: DESIRABLE; WHAT WILL THE US DO IF GENEVA AGREEMENTS SATISFACTORY BUT PAKS WON'T SIGN WITHOUT INTERIM GOVERNMENT: IF PAKS DON'T SIGN THERE IS NO AGREEMENT, BUT WE HOPE TO COORDINATE CLOSELY WITH GOP WITH WHOM WE HAVE COME A LONG WAYS TOWARD AN HISTORIC ACHIEVEMENT. SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS OFFERED SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE ADMINISTRATION IN PROCEEDING FORWARD WITH THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS. END SUMMARY.

2. (U) THE ASIA SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, CHAIRED BY STEVE SOLARZ, HELD ITS SECOND HEARING ON AFGHANISTAN, FEBRUARY 25. WITNESSES WERE DEPUTY ASSISTANT ROBERT PECK FROM STATE AND ASSISTANT TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE VINCE CANNISTRARO. THE HEARING WAS PRECEDED BY AN INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE. ATTENDANCE AT THE HEARING WAS LIMITED TO CHAIRMAN SOLARZ AND RANKING MINORITY MEMBER LEACH. CONGRESSMEN WILSON, TORRICELLI, AND LAGOMARSINO JOINED THEM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING. TEXT OF THE PECK TESTIMONY SENT BY WIRELESS FILE.

3. (U) IN HIS OPENING REMARKS, CHAIRMAN SOLARZ NOTED THAT WE MAY BE ON THE VERGE OF AN HISTORIC AGREEMENT. HE DESCRIBED THE MUJAHIDIN ALLIANCE PROPOSALS FOR A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT TO BE A "SIGNIFICANT CONCESSION." HE PRAISED THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE AND DESCRIBED THE GLOBAL POSITIVE IMPLICATIONS OF A SOVIET WITHDRAWAL. BUT SOLARZ WAS CRITICAL OF PAKISTAN, SUGGESTING GOP MAY NOT WISH TO TAKE YES FOR AN ANSWER, AND CONCLUDED THAT "PAKISTAN WAS AT THE ELEVENTH HOUR INTRODUCED NEW CONDITIONS THAT MAY MAKE SUCH A WITHDRAWAL MORE DIFFICULT." SOLARZ NOTED LEGITIMATE CONCERNS THAT THE SOVIETS COULD CONTINUE TO SEND SUPPLIES TO PAKUL, BUT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

() RELEASE () DECLASSIFY

() EXCISE () DENY

() DECLASSIFY in PART

() DELETE

REVIEWED BY: BUB

Date: 7/31/89

FOR EO 12812-2

() CLASSIFY as

() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C. OADR

TS authority to:

OADR

CONFIDENTIAL
Department of State

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 02 OF 02 STATE 052454

2717

SHOULD BE PUSHED FORWARD AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. HE DECLINED TO PREDICT "WHEN, OR HOW OR WHETHER" THE TWO TRACKS MIGHT COME TOGETHER, AND SAID THAT THAT ISSUE DOES NOT NEED TO BE ADDRESSED NOW. TO THE FINAL QUESTION, HE

REPLIED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD HAVE TO MAKE THAT DECISION IF IT AROSE, BUT NOTED THAT OUR BOTTOM LINE IS THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS; IF THAT IS ACHIEVABLE, THE USG IS LIKELY TO WANT TO PUSH AHEAD.

9. (U) LEACH ASKED FOR REACTION TO DEMANDS PUT FORWARD BY ROSANNE KLASS IN TESTIMONY THE PREVIOUS WEEK. HE WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROBLEM OF AFGHAN CHILDREN WHO HAVE BEEN TAKEN THE USSR FOR IMDOCTRINATION AND URGED THE USG TO PRESS FOR THEIR RETURN.

10. (U) LEACH ALSO QUOTED SELIG HARRISON ON AN ALLIANCE DOMINATED BY FUNDAMENTALISTS. PECK NOTED THAT THE TERM "FUNDAMENTALISTS" IN THE AFGHAN CONTEXT DENOTES SOMETHING QUITE DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF IRANIAN RADICALS. HE SUGGESTED THAT A RESISTANCE GOVERNMENT IN AFGHANISTAN WILL BE ISLAMIC, BUT THAT IT WAS LIKELY TO BE "TRADITIONALIST" RATHER THAN IN THE IRANIAN MODE.

11. (U) SOLARZ RETURNED TO THE KEY QUESTION OF WHAT THE U.S. WOULD DO IF THE PAKS INSIST ON INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS. PECK REPLIED THAT WE HAVE COME A LONG WAY IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN AND ARE NOW APPROACHING AN HISTORIC AGREEMENT. WE WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT IN THE FINAL STRETCH TO BE SURE THAT WE AND PAKISTAN REMAIN IN STEP. HE SAID HE WAS HOPEFUL THAT WE WILL REACH A MEETING OF THE MINDS AS WE APPROACH THE RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE.

12. (U) KABUL AND MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. VALLIS

03 60NF 10ENT 1AL 71030